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Abstract 
 
Why do states choose to intervene in certain civil wars and abstain from taking 
an active role in others? I argue that the choice process of the possible interveners is 
characterized by a number of international factors, most important ones being 
internationalization of the conflict, and contiguity, alliance patterns, and shared 
population characteristics between the possible intervener and the state in conflict. I 
empirically examine the countries that experienced a civil war in the Middle East 
following the Iranian Revolution, using a conflict and possible intervener dyad, 
analyzing 18 instances of civil war covering a temporal span of 29 years, between 1979 
and 2007. To capture the essence of strategic behavior, the dyadic data includes 
different variables from individual state level, dyadic level and system level. The results 
of the analysis show that contiguity, alliance and internationalization of the conflict 
provide the most robust explanations for third party support to rebel groups. With the 
results, we can claim that states perceive third-party intervention as leverage against 
other states. When there are no other options outside a militarized interstate dispute, 
states may choose to apply pressure using these conflicts as a foreign policy tool. 
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Tez Danı%manı: M. Emre Hatipo!lu 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: "ç sava%, müdahale, Orta Do!u, tercih süreci 
 
 
Özet 
 
Neden ülkeler belirli iç sava%larda müdahalelerde bulunurken di!erlerinde aktif 
bir rol almaktan kaçınırlar? Devletlerin di!er iç sava%lara müdahalelere giri%meden önce 
göz önünde bulundurdukları uluslararası faktörler, bu seçim sürecinde devletlerin 
hareketlerini açıklamak için önemli araçlardır. Bu tezde, "ran Devrimi’nden sonraki 
süreçte Orta Do!u’da iç sava% ya%amı% ülkelerin çatı%ma ve muhtemel müdahaleci 
devlet çiftinin analiz birimi olarak kullanıldı!ı ampirik bir incelemesi yapılmı%tır. 1979 
ve 2007 yılları arasında 18 farklı iç sava% devlet seviyesinde, ikili ili%kiler kullanılarak, 
ve sistem seviyesinde analiz edilmi%tir. Analizin sonuçları iki devlet arasındaki sınır 
payla%ımı ve ittifakın, ve çatı%manın uluslararası bir seviyeye çıkmasının ayrılıkçı 
gruplara üçüncü-parti deste!ini en iyi %ekilde açıkladı!ını göstermi%tir. Bu analizin 
sonuçları, devletlerin ayrılıkçı gruplara sa!ladı!ı üçüncü-parti deste!i di!er devletlere 
kar%ı bir dı% politika aracı olarak kullanabildi!ini göstermi%tir. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
It has been almost two decades since the Iraqi Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani 
claimed that Syria used the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in 1992, which had been 
openly rebelling against the Turkish state since 1984, as a tool to apply pressure against 
Turkey.1 In the same year, Hamas, the largest militant Islamic faction in the Israeli-
occupied territories, entered a new alliance with Iran after Tehran publicly offered 
support for the intifada and media exposure in Iran to the Palestinian question.2 These 
conflicts, between Turkey and the PKK, and Israel and Hamas have yet to come to a 
definite end, and we have seen many other cases of past and ongoing conflicts in which 
an interested third-party intervened. Syria has provided safe havens and ideological 
support for the PKK to aid against their struggle against the Turkish government. 
Similarly, Hamas has received weapons, military training and ideological support from 
Iran and Syria against Israel. As a couple of stark examples among numerous others, 
these snapshots reveal foreign powers often choose to involve themselves in such 
intrastate conflicts.3 
This study asks why third party states support some rebel groups in a country 
that experiences civil conflict while other rebel groups do not receive any foreign 
support. 4  With this question, I aim to provide explanations to a number of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 “Kurdish leader hits out at militants; Barzani voices contempt for PKK and its 
commander.” The Guardian (London), April 2, 1992. 
2 "Iran pledges to aid Hamas in fight for 'free Palestine'." The Independent (London), 
November 17, 1992. 
3 In this study, civil conflict and interstate conflict will be used interchangeably. 
4 Note that a third party can also support a home government against the rebels, as has 
been the case with Iran supporting the Turkish government during the last decade. 
While explaining when and how two states ally against a rebel group is an intriguing 
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previously unanswered questions raised by the theoretical literature on third-party 
intervention in civil wars using a novel research design. I claim that the choice of the 
foreign powers on whether or not to intervene rests on realist expectations. A better 
depiction of this choice process contributes towards building a more comprehensive 
theory for the civil war intervention literature. Being able to present the dynamics of 
such a choice process will allow us to review and integrate elements of external 
intervention into civil war research, that simultaneously takes into account the usage of 
foreign intervention in civil conflicts as a means of exerting policy tool for states. 
Existing studies have asked whether a civil war internationalizes (e.g. Gleditsch, 2007; 
Sarkees, 2000), however, due to their monadic design, these analyses have been unable 
to distinguish among different rebel groups within a home country. This thesis brings a 
novel perspective to the question of why we observe third-party interventions in certain 
conflicts as a foreign policy tool for the possible intervener. 
To be able to answer the question why countries support certain rebel groups in 
civil war while others do not receive any foreign support, I will be observing the 
intervention patterns of countries and the inclusion of transnational components these 
intrastate conflicts will be of utmost importance to be able to understand the 
mechanisms of intervention in civil war. As such, this study is an innovation - it 
simultaneously looks at home-intervener country, intervener country-rebel group and 
home country-rebel group relations.  
This thesis presents a discussion on the choice processes of possible interveners 
in civil conflicts in the Middle East from 1979 to 2007, providing both a descriptive 
theoretical background on intervention patterns of states, and statistical analyses to test 
the hypotheses built on the theoretical debates for correlates of external support for 
rebel groups. The first section motivates my research question through identifying gaps 
in literature and emphasizes where international relations literature falls short of 
capturing the concepts of intervention in intrastate wars. I propose a series of 
hypotheses; building on the existing literature on interstate interventions. The next 
section devises the research methodology that aims to address these challenges. More 
specifically, I discuss the methodological choices and motivate my spatiotemporal 
domain. In this section, I also present the data set that I will be using by introducing the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
academic endeavor in itself, this study will only focus on a third party’s decision to 
support a specific insurgent group. 
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existing data sets and the variables. Section Four presents and discusses the findings, 
and gives a discussion on why certain suspects (e.g. contiguity, alliance) alongside 
others (e.g. shared populations, internationalization of conflict) turn out to be significant 
predictors of third-party involvement. The concluding section discusses the implications 
of my findings and establishes further avenues for research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL MOTIVATION 
 
 
 
 
For many, the stable bipolar system that emerged after World War II predicted a 
significant decline in global warfare (e.g. Waltz, 1979; Gaddis, 1987). While the Cold 
War indeed reduced the number of interstate conflicts (Gurr, Marshall, and Khosla, 
2001), other types of conflict, especially civil (intrastate) war and decolonization (extra-
systemic) wars experienced a surge during as well as after this time period (Sarkees et 
al. 2003). Rendering support to Kegley’s (1991) point that the great-power peace since 
1945 should not be regarded as a move toward a more peaceful international situation, 
especially after examining the entire local and interstate system. 
The increased salience of conflicts occurring within –rather than between- states 
(Henderson and Singer, 2000) has made civil war a popular topic in international 
relations literature.5 A considerable amount of the research focuses on definitions (e.g. 
Sambanis, 2004; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006), onset and escalation (e.g. Collier and 
Hoeffler, 1998; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Ross, 2004; Sambanis, 2001), duration (e.g. 
Collier et al., 2004; Fearon, 2004; Regan, 1998) and severity (e.g. Lacina, 2006) of civil 
wars. However, to review these conflicts as a “part and parcel of the international 
system” like Modelski suggests (as cited by Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce, 2008, 
p. 348) is the first and foremost step in recognition of the international dimensions of 
civil wars. To explain these dimensions of civil wars, one strand of literature has 
converged on the role of third parties in civil conflicts. 
In this line of thinking, third party states often involve themselves with the 
insurgent group and the government. In exploring these interactions in civil conflict 
Gleditsch (2007, p. 295) argues, “international relations research usually insists that 
states do not exist in isolation but are influenced by their interaction and exposure to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 See Sambanis (2002) for a detailed review of recent advances in the quantitative 
literature on civil war. 
 5 
other states.” Interestingly, studies looking at national level causes and consequences of 
civil war have often looked at the international dimension. 
However, the inclusion of third-party intervention as a key independent variable 
in various models of civil conflict duration (e.g., Regan 2002) and outcome (e.g., De 
Rouen and Sobek 2004) reveals the importance of the role of third-party interveners in 
civil conflicts. As Sambanis (2002) suggests, the growing research on third-party roles 
in international relations literature has mostly focused on external intervention in the 
last couple decades; most studies that focus on third party intervention perceive the 
interactions between the state, the rebel group, and the third party as central to the civil 
war process (see inter alia, Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce, 2008; Carment, James, 
and Rowlands, 1997; Aydin, 2011; Findley, 2006; Regan, 2002). To provide a wider 
explanation, civil war intervention research needs to consider the causes of the conflict 
and the extent of the relationships between the civil war state, possible intervener and 
the insurgent group. 
 
 
 
2.1. Approaches to External Intervention In Civil War 
The study of external intervention in intrastate conflicts has gone through a long 
and arduous process. Regan (1998) points out to three relevant problems in past works 
that had risen in this process. First, most of the past civil war intervention literature only 
considers military activities that aim to affect the balance of power (and possibly, 
change the status quo) between the warring parties as an encompassing definition of 
intervention (Hufbauer and Schott, 1983). This definition does not include economic 
sanctions, diplomatic interventions or threats to use force, because of the lower risk 
associated with the decision to intervene in such a manner. Second, little interest has 
been shown in third-party interventions in intrastate conflicts compared to interventions 
in interstate conflicts. Last, he claims that there is relatively low systematic evidence to 
support the claims that have been put forth by these studies (e.g. Kaufmann, 1996). 
Still, we have seen a growing number of studies since the time of publication of 
Regan’s work, on civil war intervention (see inter alia, Carment and Rowlands, 1998; 
Cetinyan, 2002; Regan, 2002) and contagion (Beardsley, 2011; Buhaug and Gleditsch, 
2008; Braithwaite, 2010; Gleditsch, 2007; Kathman, 2010). Furthermore, these 
empirical endeavors give supporting evidence to previous prescriptive arguments put 
forth by Kaufmann (1996). 
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Scholars have employed a variety of different theoretical approaches to explain 
intervention in civil conflicts. Structural factors, conflict management, and the effects 
and conditions of intervention constitute the three main approaches in explaining civil 
war intervention.  Structural factors consider the internal dynamics of the civil conflict, 
as a basis for civil war intervention. Using this approach, Carment, James, and 
Rowlands (1997) argue that conflicts with an ethnic component tend to attract more 
interveners, especially from the states that share ethnic ties with the insurgent group. 
Studies focusing on the conflict management aspect of intervention for the civil 
conflict, ask whether and how interveners aim to reduce the human cost in the conflict 
in the short term and resolve the dispute between the home state and the insurgent group 
in later stages (e.g. Regan, 2000). Other studies analyze the effects of intervention on 
civil war duration and outcome, explaining how an intervention might hasten the 
conflict termination (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000) or extend the duration of the 
conflict (e.g. Regan, 2002). While these studies have been able to capture the conditions 
under which civil wars terminate, prolong, or experience external intervention, they still 
do not explicitly specify the reasons of intervention and the choice process of the 
intervener in a civil war. 
To observe a civil war, both the conditions for intervention should materialize, 
and the intervener should show its willingness. In other words, there should be both the 
opportunity and the willingness to intervene (Most and Starr, 1989). Relatively little 
attention has been shown to either the supply or demands side of this phenomenon (cf. 
Findley and Teo, 2006; Regan 1998). Rather, the ongoing debate among international 
relations scholars regarding the effects of intervention mostly focuses on a civil 
conflict’s duration (e.g. Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000; Gleditsch and Beardsley, 
2003; Kathman, 2010; Regan, 2000) and its outcome (e.g. Gent, 2008; Mattes and 
Savun, 2010). A parallel strand explores the design and timing of third party 
intervention in civil war (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2002; Regan and Aydin, 2006). 
These three approaches are quite useful in developing a coherent theoretical framework 
for understanding the mechanisms of third-party intervention in intrastate conflict, and, 
in turn, necessitate developing a model to bring these dimensions towards 
understanding an intervener’s choice to involve itself in a civil conflict. 
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2.2. Intervention in Civil War as a Choice Process 
Existing studies on civil war intervention tend to overlook the decision process 
of the third-party intervener. “Attaining a coherent and useful definition of foreign 
intervention” is also further “complicated by the need to understand the nature of the 
conflict that underlies the intervention, as well as by the need to account for the 
complex mix of factors that can shape an intervention strategy” (Elbadawi and 
Sambanis, 2002, p. 8). 
To counter these challenges, Balch-Lindsay et al. (2008) develop a framework 
that incorporates these dimensions into a single civil war process and highlight certain 
dynamics that can be identified using this approach. Modeling an intervener’s decision 
to get involved in a specific conflict is an essential first step towards a comprehensive 
understanding of civil conflict dynamics. Assuming potential interveners are utility 
maximizers, we can expect a third party’s ex-ante belief on expected utility of 
intervention to be the main influence while making a choice on whether to intervene in 
a conflict or not (Aydin, 2010). Being rational actors, states try to reduce the 
uncertainties before acting as an intervener. It is thus important to understand why some 
potential interveners choose not to do so as well, thus reaffirming Balch-Lindsay et al.’s 
(2008, p. 349) claim that third parties are central to the civil war process, “even 
decisions by third parties not to intervene overtly in a civil war has meaningful 
consequences for the manner in which civil wars evolve.” 
To comprehend the role and the decisions of third parties in the civil war 
process, such an approach is instrumental to be able to model the intervention decisions 
of states. If foreign states strategically select themselves as a party in the intrastate 
conflict, an interests-based explanation of civil war needs to be discussed in a way 
where the relations between the potential intervener and the civil war country, and the 
potential intervener and the insurgent group hold a high degree of importance. In doing 
so, we can identify the strategic decision making process of the potential intervener and 
factor in the usual suspects of realist, liberal domestic and rationalist explanations for 
civil war intervention outcomes in my empirical model. 
An analysis of the causes and the choice processes of third-party intervention 
reveal certain trends in the patterns of interested third parties. Regan (1998) presents 
different theoretical explanations of why we observe interventions in civil conflict: from 
a realist perspective we may observe interventions only when clear national interests are 
at stake (Bull 1984; Morgenthau 1967). Dyadic power relations, foreign policy 
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similarities and existing rivalries between two states may explain the decision to 
intervene. Domestic policy goals also play a more important role while choosing to 
intervene. When ethnic affinities exist between the insurgent group and a potential 
intervener, the selectorate may pressure the leaders to pursue a foreign strategy to help 
their co-ethnics (e.g. Roy, 1997; Saideman, 1997). Finally, from an ideational 
perspective, such as interpreting third-party intervention as humanitarian intervention to 
prevent violence and shorten the duration of the war, a third party state may intervene 
when the conflict is "ripe for resolution" (Zartman, 1989) or to “stop the killing” 
(Licklider, 1993).6 
 
 
 
2.3. The Neorealism vs. Liberalism and Neoliberalism Debate 
The ongoing debate between "political realism" (or “neorealism”) and 
"liberalism” (or “neoliberalism”) points to another set of expectations regarding the 
propensity for a state to intervene in a civil conflict. Notwithstanding Sambanis’s (2002, 
p. 225) assertion that neither theory can provide a sufficiently rich framework for 
explaining different aspects of civil war, both approaches yield valid and testable 
hypotheses for civil war intervention decisions. Indeed, Keohane and Nye (1977, p. 21) 
claim that their alternative explanations to realist assumptions do not completely reflect 
the political reality; “most situations fall between these two extremes” and should be 
explained using both assumptions. In this multilateral framework, identification of the 
countries that choose to intervene and the underlying reasons behind their choice should 
be noted. As such, adhering to only one set of assumptions would hamper the prospect !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 One may argue that rational choice theory, emanating from economics, can subsume 
all these three approaches. Economic rational choice theory focuses on the trade-offs 
between the opposing factions and gives us an insight on why fighting is so frequent 
even though it is a pareto-inefficient outcome (Hirshleifer, 1995; Fearon 1995). There 
are many explanations of civil war that utilize economic theories to understand the rent-
seeking behavior, decreased time discounting observing a higher duration if decisive 
outcomes are not guaranteed (Fearon, 2004) or skewed ideas about military prospects 
(Collier et al., 2004). Political rational choice theory also follows a similar pattern to the 
explanations given for economic theory of war, yet the main factor to analyze while 
observing the actions of the agents are focused more on political oppression, collapsing 
institutions, system transition, or informational problems. Viewing intervention in civil 
wars in a similar vein, low expected costs accrued by the intervening state might result 
in a lower threshold of entry. While this approach helps us explain the intervention 
behavior of third party states, these ex-post illustrations alone do little to help without 
the expectations of realist, liberal domestic or ideational expectations. 
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of achieving an encompassing explanation concerning the intervention of foreign 
powers on their choices on whether to intervene or not. 
 
 
 
2.3.1. The Neorealist Camp 
The great-power peace in the bipolar post-World War II system has further 
shifted to a more stable system as the relative state capability consolidated in the hands 
of one state following the end of the Cold War. With the relative stability of the 
international system in this period, neorealism suggests that the system would 
experience less warfare. However, Gurr’s (1994) findings show the surge of what he 
calls “ethno-political conflicts” since 1945; the number of such conflicts has doubled 
from the 1950s to 1990s and Sarkees et al. (2003, p. 53) interpret the majority of these 
ethno-political conflicts as “civilizational” according to Huntington’s definition. This 
evidence falls in line with Brecher and Wilkinfeld’s (1997, p. 1) claim that “the post-
World War II international system has been characterized by persistent violence in 
many regions.” 
With a realist perspective, expectations of “new wars of the third kind” (Holsti, 
1996) and a higher number of activities by paramilitary actors (Kaldor, 1999) emerge in 
an international system that is more “stable,” since sponsoring political and/or territorial 
change through civil wars becomes a more effective strategy when the balance of power 
effectively prohibits conventional interstate warfare. If we consider intervention as a 
foreign policy tool in this framework, a state would be more likely to support an 
insurgent against a host that is stronger, against another state that supports the rival 
organization (or a state), or poses a high security threat. Note that, there are not a lot of 
studies that look at intervention as a foreign policy tool, resulting in an even lower 
number of studies that examine it at the interstate level. However, intervention can also 
be seen as a tool used by states to influence civil war dynamics (Lemke and Regan 
2004) and will be treated as a foreign policy tool in itself. 
Dyadic power relations can be considered one of the strongest explanatory 
factors to explain the reasons of third-party intervention, both in great-power 
intervention and in regional power intervention. Walt (1985) suggests that states desire 
to keep the balance of power between each other by forming alliances according to the 
threat responses from other sources. While the direction of the perceived risks may stay 
the same, states are expected to form these kinds of alliances with non-state actors, in a 
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similar pattern. When states do not (or cannot due to systemic consequences) confront 
each other in conventional warfare, they may use these alliances with the non-state 
actors to overcome possible imbalances of power. Examples abound in great-power 
intervention: the operations of the United States in Vietnam or the Soviet involvement 
in Afghanistan against the Afghan rebels are cases where great powers find themselves 
sponsoring a group as a means to achieve a larger agenda. If we apply a similar logic to 
regional systems, we see a similar pattern. Iran and Iraq using civil conflicts, as an 
opportunity to continue their power struggle following the Iran-Iraq War is such an 
example. 
In both cases, we observe two states locked in a struggle to increase their 
relative capability while still refraining from open warfare. To illustrate, Iraq has 
provided economic and military support, and allowed access to its territory shortly 
before the end of the Cold War to the People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran 
(Mujahideen-e Khalq) that was formed to overthrow the theocratic regime in Iran. 
Likewise, Iran has followed the same strategy and has provided Supreme Council for 
the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) with weapons and military training and has also 
given access to its territory against SCIRI’s struggle against the Iraqi government. 
For our purposes, a higher ratio of state capabilities would mean a stronger 
possible intervener and stronger interveners can be expected to engage in economic and 
military interventions more aggressively. Conversely, high relative capability in favor 
of the state in the conflict will result in more passive interventions if there is a will to 
intervene. I predict that opportunity-based intervention will be more relevant when the 
intervening state has power parity with the host government, and the active 
interventions will increase with the relative power of the third party, leading to 
Hypothesis 1. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Among states willing to intervene, more capable states will choose 
to intervene, and they will commit more resources into supporting the 
rebel group. 
 
Foreign policy dissimilarity and alliance patterns between states are other 
important factors to consider for third-party intervention, and stem from a line of 
thinking similar to dyadic power relations. States that frequently find each other in 
opposing camps, such as regarding the politics of a region, can use intervention as a tool 
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that provides leverage against the other. Also, policy similarity between a possible 
intervener and a rebel group may also provide a reason for intervention, as was the case 
in the U.S. involvement in Guatemala in 1954. This is further illustrated in Forsythe 
(1992) and James and Mitchell (1995) where even two allied states that have similar 
foreign policy goals may opt to use interventions to pursue their foreign policy goals. 
The internationalization of the conflict is another point to consider about the 
nature of the interaction between the three actors in the conflict. In internationalized 
conflicts, we can expect a higher propensity to intervene by neighboring countries and 
allied states, because of the perception of an immediate threat from other international 
actors if they choose to take part in the conflict. We have established that intervention 
can be used as a foreign policy tool; thus, states would be willing to support their allies 
and exert influence when there are other non-allied major powers in the conflict: 
 
Hypothesis 2: States will refrain from supporting the rebel groups in conflict in 
allied states. 
Hypothesis 3a: States willing to intervene will choose to support rebel groups in 
internationalized conflicts. 
Hypothesis 3b: States willing to intervene will choose to support rebel groups 
that are not considered terrorist organizations. 
 
However, the security risks and the decision to intervene associated with dyadic 
power relations and foreign policy dissimilarity are exacerbated by spatial factors. 
Lemke (2002) provides a detailed analysis of the power projection capabilities of states 
in interstate conflict, augmenting the importance of the proximity of states. Borrowing 
the conceptual framework of opportunity and willingness from Most and Starr (1989), 
we can see that “[neighboring states’] proximity to the conflict opens the window of 
intervention opportunity” (Kathman, 2010, p. 991). While it is previously maintained 
that opportunity alone is not a sufficient condition for intervention, we can underscore 
the importance of contiguity for states that also have the willingness to intervene. 
Third parties that share a border with a country that experiences civil war may 
be drawn to intervention for a number of reasons. Apart from the assumptions of higher 
threat responses from a neighboring country, or having foreign policy goals about 
overlapping interests that might clash, states need to be aware of possible contagion 
effects that can result from shared ethnic populations and shared religion (Gleditsch 
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2007; Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008). These ties become even more salient when the rebel 
group in a civil war shares kinship with a portion of the population of a possible 
intervener (Forsberg, 2008). This is not to say that contiguity is a necessary condition 
for intervention, as can be seen in Iranian support for Hamas and Hezbollah in Israel, 
but a factor that may increase a state’s propensity to intervene in the conflict as a third 
party. 
Contiguity and border sharing may have two opposite effects. The first one is 
regarding the threat response: as a potential intervener’s likelihood of being infected by 
a contiguous civil war increases, the potential intervener’s likelihood of intervening in 
the conflict also increases. Border sharing might amount to a higher threat perception 
for the intervener if the conflict is in close proximity: 
 
Hypothesis 4: States that share a border are more likely to intervene in each 
other’s internal conflicts. 
 
Another issue in intervention between contiguous states is that while one state 
interferes and harbors armed groups that operate on other countries borders, states 
affected by the civil war may not be able to find ways to directly deal with 
demonstration effects in other neighboring countries (Kuran, 1998) and a possible 
secession may lead to a further contagion effect (Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008). These 
factors may act as foundations for civil conflicts to cluster in space, and in time, causing 
a higher threat response from other neighboring countries. Such a perception would 
reduce the threshold of entry to civil war as a third party as a form of self-defense. 
Also relevant to this discussion is the nature of the incompatibility between the 
rebel group and the state. That is, nature of the conflict is important for contiguous 
states. The effects of foreign intervention is twofold; the nature of the rebel group will 
define the possible reasons of intervention, may it be opportunism or threat response, 
while giving the possible intervener a justification to intervene. The close ties that we 
can draw from the nature of civil war concern the incentives to intervene. A territorial 
civil war will raise instability and translate as a higher security risk for contiguous 
states. Furthermore, if there are shared identities, a secessionist civil war can be a direct 
threat to the sponsor country such as contagion effects (Kathman, 2010). Therefore, it is 
safe to assume that neighboring countries will have a direct stake in the outcome of the 
conflict. A governmental civil war can be said to have less of such effects for the 
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sponsor country, which would result in lesser cases and lower degrees of intervention, 
as their stakes in involvement are lower. 
 
Hypothesis 5:  States willing to intervene will choose to support rebel groups 
that are fighting revolutionary wars more, compared to rebel groups 
engaged in secessionist wars. 
 
 
 
2.3.2. The Liberal and Neoliberal Camp 
While neorealist claims may present plausible explanations for the intervention 
decisions of third parties and depict the possible reasons that arise from the relative 
position of the possible intervener in the international system, these assumptions have 
shortcomings in answering where these preferences come from. An explanation that is 
solely based on dyadic power relations, or potential threat responses is a naïve attempt 
at its best; there are other variables in the equation like the domestic support for the 
incumbent party, trade relations between the states, effects of international institutions 
or the international prestige of the country. As such, an analysis that considers the threat 
response from a rebel group that wages its war based on their ethnic identity and 
succeeds in seceding from the state and controls for the possible domestic ramifications 
of such an event in the case of a shared ethnic or religious background with that rebel 
group would be able to provide a better picture. 
While the key assumptions of liberalism and neoliberalism may be characterized 
as antithetical to neorealism, they should be categorized together as rationalist 
approaches that benefit from one another. Furthering this assertion, following the main 
tenets of neoliberalism that had been laid out by Keohane’s After Hegemony (1984), is 
the scholarly debate between Keohane and Grieco over the neoliberal assumptions 
(Grieco, 1990; 1993; Keohane, 1993). Their discussion has spurred considerable debate 
within the scholarly literature, over whether realist assumptions had been correctly 
analyzed by Keohane, and the debate revealed the converging points of these two 
perspectives. While these analyses of the structural anarchy in the international system 
had substantive differences, the analytical convergence of neorealism and neoliberalism 
show that hypotheses that are presented can be analyzed together using the same model. 
There are, indeed, multiple channels through which states can take action to reach their 
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goals when a militaristic action is not the only policy tool to exert (Keohane and Nye, 
1987). 
The three main characteristics of “complex interdependence,” which challenge 
the neorealist assumptions, present us with three expectations of the behavior of states 
in such a situation: (1) There are multiple channels that connect societies, which can be 
summarized as interstate, transgovernmental, and transnational relations; the latter only 
apply when we relax the realist assumptions of the “normal channels,” which are 
interstate relationships. (2) Issues in interstate relationships are not arranged 
hierarchically, unlike neorealist claims that military security is the most salient issue 
that determines states’ actions; many issues actually arise from domestic policies within 
and in between governments. (3) Military force may be irrelevant in resolving 
disagreements regarding economic or ideological issues  (Keohane and Nye, 1977). 
Using these assumptions, we can construct a framework to provide alternative 
hypotheses to why states intervene in certain civil wars. 
Third-party interventions in civil conflicts are “risky business”; yet, we do 
observe a higher frequency of outside interventions that “mask the extent of the risk” 
(Regan, 1998). Apart from the security risks highlighted in the previous section, 
applying liberal and neoliberal claims for interstate war to intervention decisions of 
states for our purposes reveal alternative explanations: democratic states and their 
leaders recognize other democracies as operating under the same principals considering 
norms and institutions, and act accordingly (see inter alia, Bueno de Mesquita et al., 
2003; Lipson, 2003; MacMillan, 1998; Russett, 1993); states commit resources on 
intervention that could be spent on public policies and domestic projects (e.g. Bove and 
Sekeris, 2011); trade relations between states contribute to a more peaceful environment 
(e.g. Hegre, 2000; Oneal and Russett 1999; but see Barbieri, 1996); or states may lose 
international prestige, since “prestige not only matters, but is also an important causal 
factor in international relations” (Kim, 2004, p.52) and government reputation (e.g. 
Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce, 2008) throughout the process. Therefore, the 
incumbent party in the potential intervener state should have sufficient incentives 
towards committing material and/or human resources in such interstate conflict beyond 
its borders. With such a wide range of assumptions, given these different expectations 
from states, it is important to draw the next set of hypotheses using these explanations. 
Democratic peace theory is “probably the most powerful liberal contribution to 
the debate on the causes of war and peace” (Rosato, 2003, p.585). Democratic peace 
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theorists suggest that democracies rarely -if ever- go to war, and the correlations remain 
robust (e.g. Maoz 1998; Oneal and Russett 1999; Russett 1993).7 Despite the challenges 
to the theory (e.g. Rosato, 2003; Spiro, 1994) and alternative explanations to why we 
observe such a scenario (e.g. Gartzke, 1998), the causal mechanisms highlighted in 
these studies provide us with enough incentives to view democratic peace as an 
empirical regularity (Kinsella, 2005). Furthermore, any possible evidence that points to 
an autocratic peace also corroborates any assumption on the relationship between polity 
similarity and lack of conflict - even if the assumptions are challenged for using a 
similar theoretical basis (see inter alia Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999; Gelpi and 
Griesdorf, 2001; Reiter and Stam, 2002). 
Applying the basic tenets of democratic peace to third-party intervention in 
intrastate conflicts, we can expect states with similar regime qualities to potentially 
interfere less within each other’s internal affairs. More specifically, democracies and 
autocracies will be less likely to intervene against each other. While Lemke and Regan 
(2004, p.163) report, “democratic linkages do not determine the outcome of intervention 
influence opportunities,” their non-finding is contrary to what Hermann and Kegley find 
in their previous studies (Hermann and Kegley, 1996; Kegley and Hermann, 1995), 
motivating Hypothesis 6: 
 
Hypothesis 6: Among states willing to intervene, higher regime difference with 
the country experiencing civil war will result in a higher tendency to 
intervene. 
 
Comparable to democratic peace theorists’ claims, that joint democracy 
decreases states’ propensity to go to war by increasing associated costs, states that trade 
extensively enjoy a similar kind of peace where a conflict would strain both economies 
(Hegre, 2000). Indeed, there are a slew of academic studies that indicate that 
“economically important trade” has benefits for reducing interstate violence.8 Hegre 
also explores a possibility where the increased communication options between the 
inhabitants of the trading states, resulting in a further strengthening of peace-building !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 While an in-depth discussion of the democratic peace theory is beyond the scope of 
this section, a thorough discussion can be found in Russett et al. (1995). 
8 See Oneal and Russett (1999) for a detailed list of research reports that show the 
positice effect of trade relations for the reduction of interstate violence. 
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institutions. With this liberal set of theses regarding the conflict-reducing effects of 
increased trade relations, we can expect a decrease in conflicts with increasing 
development of states. 
However, Barbieri (1996) provides an alternative explanation; we need to 
consider that states with tighter economic ties also find themselves where their 
economic linkages are shaped by the nature and context of the relationship. That is, 
states that benefit from a closer trade relationship are already interlocked in a situation 
where the actions of one could have direct repercussions for the other’s goals. In a 
similar vein, Peterson (2011) suggests that third-party trade ties may be able to affect 
the dyadic relationship by tipping the balance for the favor of one side in the dyad. 
These two contrasting arguments about trade dependency between two states 
also hold a high degree of importance for determining the type of the relationship 
between a civil-war-state and the potential intervener. Following the first strand of 
thought, we would expect a higher threshold of entry for the potential intervener for 
states that are highly dependent on each other economically, while the second would 
imply an already existing clash of international goals, allowing the use of intervention 
tactics to be able to trump over the other: 
 
Hypothesis 7: States with high degrees of trade dependency will be less likely to 
intervene in each other’s internal conflicts. 
 
With regime similarity and trade ties playing important roles in formulating the 
liberal framework for third-party intervention, the third major liberal discussion is the 
shared populations between the potential intervener and the rebel group engaged in a 
civil war. External intervention literature provides an integrated approach to 
international and internal war (Sambanis, 2002), and also gives us a domestic viewpoint 
from the actor’s side. Shared ethnicity, religion and ideology between the rebel group in 
question can be used both as international leverage - a foreign policy tool to coerce 
other states into a preferred outcome, and as a domestic policy tool that can help the 
incumbent secure a portion of the electorate that would otherwise be against the 
intervention. After all, for such a campaign, whether it may be ideological, economic or 
military, there should be domestic support for the policy (Regan, 1998, p. 757). And 
similarly important, the actions of the third party also depend on the size of the shared 
population with the rebel group and the intervening state (Nome, 2012).  
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Transnational ties between the group in ethnic conflict and the intervener are 
multifaceted. There are many alternative situations where there can be more than one of 
the predetermined shared qualities; while Hezbollah in Israel has religious and ethnic 
ties with but has not received any form of aid from Saudi Arabia, we see multiple 
instances of support from Iran to Hezbollah without sharing any ethnic ties with the 
state. Observing such situations lead to Hypotheses 8: 
 
Hypothesis 8: States willing to intervene will choose to aid rebel groups that 
share ethnic, religious and ideological ties with them. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
3.1. Research Design Decisions 
As specified previously, a number of studies have asked whether a civil war 
internationalizes and identified intervention patterns using different research designs. 
This lack of consensus on which method to use, among scholars of international politics 
and conflict resolution, stems from the relative advantages and drawbacks of different 
designs. A survey of these designs point out to two major inferential challenges that a 
research should address, namely, the need to evade selection bias in the sample and to 
control for confounding explanations. This paper draws attention to yet another 
concern: to jointly model host-intervener-insurgent relations. 
To understand why some states intervene, we should also understand why others 
do not. Basing our inferences on intervention cases only will lead to biased findings 
regarding why states support insurgents in other countries in its region. Furthermore, we 
should be able to measure the affect of our candidate explanatory factors in a ceteris 
paribus setting, i.e. we should be able to control confounding variables. To gauge this 
propensity in a number of countries’ decisions over time, this study employs a cross-
sectional time series dynamic logistic analysis.  
 
 
3.1.1. Methodological Approach 
Using a quantitative research design, compared to a qualitative research, shows 
its strengths for models dealing with empirical claims that are falsifiable, and that can 
be specified using ex ante information. To be able to test the validity of the presented 
hypotheses, large-N quantitative design “allow[s] us to evaluate a large number of 
hypotheses, while simultaneously letting us control for alternative explanations” 
(Bennett and Stam, 2004, p. 34-5). Such an approach may fall short of capturing human 
cognition, interpreting underlying causes of certain behavior of actors, or 
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psychologically based theories could provide a different set of results than rational 
choice arguments, which are addressed most efficiently using an experimental design 
(McDermott, 2002). However, for our purposes, we can expect better outcomes from 
the data and the statistical model that is established than a wide experimental or a quasi-
experimental research, which would prove to be more effective when using an actor-
centric approach. 
The second task is to construct an appropriate empirical model. Bennett and 
Stam (2004, p. 44-45) establish the superiority of dyadic analysis from the perspective it 
offers to “test comparatively hypotheses drawn from multiple levels of analysis.” 
Dyadic interaction captures the essence of strategic behavior and using the dyad-year 
makes it possible to interpret the expectations coming from different levels of analyses. 
Dyadic level analyses easily allow the inclusion of different variables from individual 
state level (e.g. regime type of the home state, nature of the civil dispute), dyadic level 
(e.g. contiguity, shared identities) and system level (e.g. polarity). Indeed, the directed 
dyad-year analyses are increasingly becoming the favored choices in international 
conflict studies (Green, Kim, and Yoon, 2001). Building on Bennett and Stam’s (2004) 
framework for risk of conflict and applying it to civil war intervention framework, the 
relative advantages of a non-directed dyadic approach prove to be more effective.9 
With these propositions in mind, I have designed and constructed a non-directed 
dyadic data set that will address the theoretical debates and allow an assessment of 
alternative answers, building on similar efforts by both interstate and intrastate 
intervention literature. Since the dependent variable is coded as both binary (whether 
there was an intervention to the civil conflict on that year by the possible intervener) 
and categorically (the nature and the extent of the intervention), to test the different 
possible relative effects, I have conducted binary logit models and multinomial logit 
models to inquire about the nature of the relationships. 
 
 
3.1.2. Spatial and Temporal Approach 
An equally critical issue for international conflict research is the choice of the 
spatial and temporal domain of the study. Most empirical large-N studies try to be as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Bennett and Stam (2004, p.44-56) provide a detailed comparison of directed vs. non-
directed dyad approaches. Since our main goal is to determine the choice processes of 
the interveners, the variables that present the reverse case (e.g. intervener - conflict) 
would be excluded from the model for our cases. 
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comprehensive as possible, expanding their domains to the point where reliable data can 
be obtained. For example, most of the Correlates of War Project data sets date back to 
1816, while UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset is a project that codes both internal 
and external armed conflicts from 1946 to present. 
Despite the tendency to be as comprehensive as possible, data availability and/or 
the posited theory’s spatiotemporal specific variables may warrant restricting the 
spatiotemporal domain of a study.10 Following Bennett and Stam’s assertions about the 
reliability of a model across space and time, I choose to constrain my data set to be able 
to capture a high degree of variance within a relatively smaller space and a short amount 
of time, building on the premise that “states’ preferences and expectations regarding 
their interactions with other states develop in the context of the states’ domestic 
political and social culture” (Bennett and Stam, 2004, p. 175). 
The choice of the region of the study was done considering the hypotheses 
presented in The Behavioral Origins of War Chapter 6 (Bennett and Stam, 2004). To be 
able to build a model based on theoretical assumptions and capture the nuances, I 
analyzed the civil war intervention patterns in various regions of the world. The choice 
of Middle East among these regions was done to counter the tremendously high 
variation in national and regional culture and ideology that exist in other regions. The 
Middle East presents us with an easily defined, yet varied enough set of ethnicities (e.g. 
Arab, Jewish, Iranian, Turkish, Kurdish), religions (e.g. Sunni Islam, Shi’a Islam, 
Judaism, Christianity) and ideologies (e.g. religious fundamentalism, liberal democracy, 
military dictatorship). This variation also exists within these groups, such as the 
different responses given to Sunni Kurds and Shiite Kurds, and within states, Syrian 
ruling party is Shi’a Muslim which governs a predominantly Sunni Muslim population, 
giving us a better understanding of interaction patterns within and between states. 
Finally, since it is not a big region, compared to Americas, Africa or Asia, states have 
the opportunity/feasibility to intervene but choose not to (Most and Starr, 1989) - thus 
giving us a meaningful group of non-events. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Baumgartner, Francia, and Morris (2008), for instance, establish the importance of 
religion in formation of the public opinion on foreign policy issues in the Middle East, 
in response to Jelen’s (1994, p. 391) assertion that “the role of religion in explaining 
attitudes toward issues of international relations is somewhat limited.” While their 
ultimate conclusions are directed more towards the role of the American public opinion 
shaping the foreign policy decisions in the face of Middle Eastern attitudes, their results 
nevertheless illustrate how a specific spatiotemporal domain could be directed towards 
a certain research agenda. 
 21 
In a region where shared ethnic and religious ties shape foreign policy attitudes, 
answering why third party states support some rebel groups in a civil war and refrain 
from participating in other conflicts as an intervener will provide us with ample 
opportunity to underscore the certain dynamics of civil war intervention. In doing so, I 
aim to capture the effects of the tighter religious and ethnic ties that shape the regional 
politics of the region. 
 
 
 
3.2. Research Design 
To explain the underlying choice mechanisms of civil war intervention, the data 
examines the countries that experienced a civil war in the Middle East following the 
Iranian Revolution, using a conflict and possible intervener dyad, and analyzes 18 
instances of civil war covering a temporal span of 29 years, between 1979 and 2007. 
Within these 18 civil war cases, the data shows 2172 dyad-years of potential 
intervention out of which 271 were realized. Interventions are coded separately as 
ideological or economic support, access to territory and military support as weapons 
supply and training, and then aggregated into a single dependent variable. 
In this study, civil war, in line with the Uppsala Con&ict Data Project’s 
definition, is defined as: “a contested incompatibility that concerns government or 
territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 
battle-related deaths. Of these two parties, at least one is the government of a state” 
(Gleditsch et al., 2002, p. 618-19). Unfortunately, such a clearly laid out framework 
does not apply to third-party interventions in civil war, as there are conflicting 
assumptions about how civil wars become internationalized. 
Third-party intervention in civil conflicts is a rare phenomenon - Gleditsch 
(2007, p. 295) points out the fact that “only about 5% of the internal conflicts in the 
Uppsala/PRIO data for 1946-2003 are considered internationalized civil wars.” 
However, the thresholds for coding for civil war are different, resulting in a different 
number of intervention cases. For example, Correlates of War project’s civil war data 
show that 25% of the cases are internationalized civil conflicts (Sarkees, 2000). 
Furthermore, we have to keep in mind that states can intervene in civil wars in other 
ways: Regan (2000) speculates that third parties may intervene to put an end to the 
dispute, while Gartzke and Gleditsch (2006) assume that third parties may also 
intervene to promote outcomes that might benefit their own interests. 
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These alternative explanations provide the rationale behind the coding scheme 
being coded differently for the different cases of intervention. Because a different mode 
of intervention (i.e. ideological intervention) is included in my data, and is from a 
smaller spatiotemporal domain, my data shows instances of intervention in 12.48% of 
the civil wars. Table 2 shows the relative frequencies of these intervention cases. 
 
Nature of Intervention Frequency Percentage 
Ideological support 155 57.19 
Economic support 165 60.88 
Access to territory 59 21.77 
Weapons supply and military training 60 22.14 
Table 1: Relative frequencies of intervention cases 
 
Ideological support includes using propaganda, diplomatic pressure and showing 
the rebels in a good light as a means of intervention. Economic intervention is easier to 
measure, but a differentiation from the military interventions is needed, as these are not 
mutually exclusive concepts. An example here is the difference between procurement of 
arms and providing training for rebel troops; providing arms is an economic and 
military aid while training is an exclusively military support. 
The difference between diplomatic interventions and military and economic 
interventions is that diplomatic interventions or attempts at mediation usually serve to 
preserve the status quo whereas the latter types of intervention are regarded as attempts 
at challenging the present conditions and tend to last longer (Regan and Aydin, 2006). 
While these claims are plausible to exclude certain attempts of intervention from 
existing models, I believe that a lot of information that may help us understand the 
intervention patterns of third parties is lost in the process. Indeed, Table 2 shows how 
relevant ideological support is for these intervention cases. Due to the relatively higher 
risks associated with providing safe havens, supplying weapons and giving military 
training to the rebel group, states with an intent to intervene, but cannot bear the risks of 
sustaining a longer and more severe conflict, utilize the former two options to help the 
rebel group in conflict. 
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3.3. Data 
The widely used Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 
2002) serves as the backbone of the data set with the Uppsala/PRIO list of state-based 
armed conflicts to identify the civil wars. To code the intervention cases in the later 
dates, I have used the same definition for armed conflict and intervention. For other 
main independent variables, I have utilized data from existing data sets, combining 
several data to obtain the variables. Aggregated data is taken directly from different 
studies, using EUGene software (Bennett and Stam, 2000): 
 
 
Variable Unit of Analysis Source Original Citation 
Intervention Dyad-year UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict 
Dataset v4 
Gleditsch, Wallensteen, 
Eriksson, Sollenberg, 
and Strand (2002) 
Capabilities Country-year COW national capabilities 
index v3.02 (CINC) 
Singer, Bremer, and 
Stuckey, (1972) 
Alliance  Dyad-year COW Alliance data set v3.03 Singer, Bremer, and 
Stuckey, (1972) 
Internationalization 
of Conflict 
Dyad-year UCDP External Support 
Project Primary Warring 
Party Dataset v1 
Högbladh, Pettersson 
and Themnér (2011) 
Contiguity/ 
Distance 
Dyad-year Contiguity from COW Direct 
contiguity data v3.1; 
Distance computed in 
EUGene 
Stinnett, Tir, Schafer, 
Diehl, and Gochman 
(2002) 
Regime Difference Country-year Polity IV Marshall and Jaggers 
(2002) 
Trade Dependency Dyad-year IMF World Economic 
Outlook Database; COW 
International Trade v3.0 
IMF (2010), Barbieri 
and Keshk (2012) 
Incompatibility Dyad-Year UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict 
Dataset v4 
Gleditsch, Wallensteen, 
Eriksson, Sollenberg, 
and Strand (2002) 
Table 2: Data Sources 
 
3.4. Independent Variables 
The major independent variables that are listed in Table 2 are critical to the 
intervention decisions of states and require more detailed explanations as well as 
descriptive statistics before moving on to subsequent analyses. 
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3.4.1. Capabilities 
This variable is a relative capability index that takes into account the ratio of the 
strengths of the two states. I use the COW national material capabilities index v3.02 
(CINC Scores) identified in Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972) to calculate the relative 
capabilities by dividing the CINC score of the possible intervener by the total CINC 
score in the dyad. The mean capability ratio is .3101868 with a standard deviation of 
.2533296. 
 
 
3.4.2. Alliance 
Alliance between states variable aims to capture the alliance patterns and is 
taken from the COW 3.0 Alliance data that was released in 2002. In my data set, the 
variable is of a binary nature and is coded as 1 if there was a defense pact, neutrality 
agreement or an entente between the states and 0 if there was no such agreement in the 
dyad. Missing values in the original data set are treated and coded according to COW 
alliance types for later dates. 
 
 
3.4.3. Internationalization of conflict 
This variable is coded using the UCDP External Support Project Primary 
Warring Party Dataset (Högbladh, Pettersson, and Themnér 2011) and is coded 1 when 
there is at least one other third-party intervener in the conflict and 0 otherwise.11 1147 
from the total of 2172 dyad-years has a third-party intervener. 
 
 
3.4.4. Foreign terrorist organization 
This variable is created using the United States Department of State list of 
foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs). The list designates the non-U.S.-based 
organizations that the U.S. Department of State has declared as terrorists and the 
variable takes the value of 1 for those groups in the conflict. 7 of the rebel organizations 
are FTOs: 1052 of the total 2172 conflict years include these groups. 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Note that this third-party intervener can be supporting the government as well. 
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3.4.5. Contiguity/ Border Sharing 
I use the COW contiguity and colonial/dependency data sets (Stinnett et al, 
2002) to code the contiguity variable. Border sharing takes the value 1 when two states 
share a land border, or are separated by a river border and 0 otherwise. Contiguity takes 
a value between 1 and 5 and coded according to the coding rules set by the Direct 
Contiguity Data for water borders. Similarly, contiguity takes a value of 1 when two 
states share a land or river border, and takes a value between 2 and 5 for states that are 
separated by at least 12, 24, 150 and 400 miles of water, respectively. 
 
 
3.4.6 Regime Difference 
I use the Polity IV Data (Marshall & Jaggers, 2002) to create a variable that 
takes a value between 0 and 20, indicating the absolute value of the regime type (Polity 
score) difference between the states for the year of the civil war. This variable shows a 
U-shaped distribution; less than 30% of the observations take a value between 5 and 15. 
 
 
3.4.7. Trade Dependency 
To create a measure for trade dependency, I have used the COW International 
Trade v3.0 (Barbieri and Keshk, 2012) data set and the IMF World Economic Outlook 
Database. The total dyadic imports and exports for the year was calculated by adding 
the in and out flows indicated by the International Trade data set and divided by that 
year’s GDP of the possible intervening state to be able illustrate the actor based 
approach. 
 
 
3.4.8. Shared Ethnicity, Religion and Ideology 
To capture the role of ethnicity, religion and ideology, I have created binary 
variables for each shared characteristic between the rebel group and the possible 
intervener. For each characteristic, I have determined the nature of the rebel group and 
the incumbent party in the intervening state. For explicit declarations of the rebel group 
about their identities, these variables take the value of 1 if the possible intervener shares 
at least 10% of the population with these characteristics unless the incumbent does not 
have a certain preference. To illustrate, Israel has about 20% Arab population, but the 
state is coded as Jewish for reasons of distinguishing Israel from other Arab states. 
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3.4.9. Incompatibility 
Nature of the civil war - or the incompatibility between the rebel group and the 
state- is taken directly from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 
2002) and coded as either territorial or governmental. 1,347 of the cases are coded as 
territorial disputes and 825 are incompatibilities concerning government (i.e. 
revolutionary wars). 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
 
 
 
 
4.1. The Basic Model 
The basic model is a logistic regression with the binary intervention variable as 
the dependent variable and the variables specified in sections 3.3. and 3.4 as the 
independent variables. However due to a severe loss in the number of observations, 
trade relationship between states is dropped from further analyses.12 Time elapsed 
without intervention (t), t-squared, and t-cubed variables are included to counter the 
effects of autocorrelation. 
The results of the logistic regression for third-party intervention in civil wars are 
reported in Table 3. This basic model reports the regression of the total intervention 
cases and supports a number of the presented hypotheses. Interestingly, state capability 
ratio, regime differences and incompatibility between the rebel group and the state do 
not play a significant role as a predictor of intervention for this model. These findings 
are counterintuitive and need to be addressed in further analyses. Since these variables 
can be argued to have direct links for perceived threat responses, using a different 
model to explain their relationship will be necessary. 
Not surprisingly, interventions increase as alliances between states decrease and 
the presence of other interveners increase. We observe a lower propensity to intervene 
for groups identified as a foreign terrorist organization. Land border sharing has a 
significant positive effect for intervention. From the shared identities, shared ethnic 
background and ideology have significant positive effects for intervention, and shared 
religion does not have such effects. Finally, there is a negative and significant effect for 
conflicts after 1991.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 When we do not include the missing values in the regression, about 80% of the 
observations are lost. If we treat the missing values for trade dependency as no trade 
between states, the model provides inconsistent results. 
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Intervention 
 
 
State capability ratio 0.458 
 (0.81) 
Alliance between states -3.455 
 (5.21)** 
Other intervener 1.940 
 (5.28)** 
FTO -0.625 
 (1.98)* 
Land border sharing 1.544 
 (5.22)** 
Regime difference 0.016 
 (0.60) 
Host-Rebel shared ethnic background 1.144 
 (3.30)** 
Host-Rebel shared religion 0.192 
 (0.68) 
Host-Rebel shared ideology 1.579 
 (5.46)** 
Post Cold War -0.722 
 (2.47)* 
Incompatibility 0.016 
 (0.04) 
Time elapsed without intervention -6.747 
 (6.54)** 
Time elapsed without intervention squared 2.247 
 (4.62)** 
Time elapsed without intervention cubed -0.210 
 (3.66)** 
Constant -3.100 
 (6.28)** 
 
N 1,968 
  * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Table 3: Logistic Regressions of Third-Party Intervention in Civil Conflicts 1979-2007 
 
 
 
4.2. Multinomial Logistic Regression 
Before moving on to further discussion of the variables, we need a more detailed 
analysis to see whether or not the insignificant variables in the basic model have a 
different explanatory power. For the second model, interventions are categorized into 
two different levels: passive interventions and active interventions. Active interventions 
can be defined as any form of intervention that includes weapons supply, military 
training and access to territory. Passive interventions are coded mostly as ideological 
 29 
support for the rebel group, but also include non-military economic support for the rebel 
group. 
 
Intervention 
 
Passive Active 
State capability ratio -0.978 1.608 
 (0.99) (1.89) 
Alliance between states -24.559 -1.181 
 (0.00) (1.85) 
Other intervener 3.783 -0.811 
 (4.84)** (1.41) 
FTO -2.786 2.658 
 (5.36)** (4.78)** 
Land border sharing 0.372 3.410 
 (0.73) (6.84)** 
Regime difference 0.051 -0.058 
 (0.94) (1.69) 
Host-Rebel shared ethnic background 1.258 1.160 
 (2.13)* (2.55)* 
Host-Rebel shared religion 1.692 -1.239 
 (2.89)** (3.10)** 
Host-Rebel shared ideology 1.503 3.028 
 (3.05)** (5.83)** 
Post Cold War -4.103 0.541 
 (4.97)** (1.49) 
Incompatibility -0.029 -0.648 
 (0.03) (1.27) 
Time elapsed without intervention -6.768 -26.242 
 (5.66)** (0.00) 
Time elapsed without intervention squared 2.588 3.347 
 (4.36)** (0.00) 
Time elapsed without intervention cubed -0.256 -0.113 
 (3.56)** (0.00) 
Constant -5.561 -5.147 
 (5.62)** (6.45)** 
N 1968 
   * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Table 4: Multinomial Logistic Regressions of Third-Party Intervention in Civil Conflicts 1979-2007 
 
In this model, we observe the hypothesized effect for the ratio of state 
capabilities at 10% significance level that was missing from the first model. A stronger 
third-party means higher active intervention, but does not yield any significant result for 
passive intervention. Alliance patterns and contiguity variables also show a similar 
pattern, showing higher levels of significance for active intervention. Interestingly, 
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rebel groups identified as foreign terrorist organizations have a negative value for 
passive, and positive value for active interventions. 
Different from the first model, shared religion has gained significance in the 
multinomial regression, having a positive effect for passive and negative effect for 
active interventions. In post-Cold War conflicts, the negative effect is revealed only for 
passive intervention cases and has lost its significance for other cases. Regime 
difference is significant at the 10% level for active interventions but has a negligible 
marginal effect for those cases. Finally, the incompatibility variable does not have a 
meaningful result for this model as well. 
 
 
 
4.3. Analysis 
Analyzing the hypotheses in the light of these two models, we can see that most 
of the neorealist assumptions provide explanations for third party interventions in civil 
wars. The analysis was not able to test for trade ties due to the high number of missing 
observations and regime difference did not reveal the desired statistical significance. 
However, it is evident that a neorealist, liberal domestic and neoliberal claims, when 
used together, hold answers for explaining the choice process of the possible 
interveners. 
State capability ratio, alliance and contiguity, as the core neorealist variables, 
can be considered more salient for active intervention cases. This is due to the fact that 
active intervention requires higher levels of commitment from the third party to 
succeed, backing up hypotheses 2 and 4. States that have elevated threat responses 
and/or want to take a more active part in shaping of the region politics would need to 
consider their relative strengths and alliance patterns before taking part as a third party 
in such a conflict. As the other main neorealist variables, other international interveners 
have a positive effect for intervention cases in the first model, but a further analysis 
reveals that this translates as passive intervention if there are other third parties in the 
conflict. Again, the negative -albeit insignificant- coefficient for active intervention 
cases could mean that states refrain from allocating higher resources to a conflict where 
interests might clash with other third parties. Similarly, the foreign terrorist organization 
variable reveals a similar pattern for the interested third parties. 
The post-Cold War variable shows a negative correlation between the tendency 
to intervene and the unipolar world system. This result can be interpreted as an indicator 
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of the perpetual peace where the presence of one major power reduced conflicts 
following the Cold War, and is in line with previous work (see Regan, 2000). However, 
since there was also a reduction of interstate wars following that period, states’ 
opportunity and willingness to interfere, through supporting rebel groups, is not 
reflected in the active intervention cases. 
Shared populations between the rebel group and the possible intervener can be 
interpreted in a number of ways. From the first model, we have seen that ethnic 
background and the ideological stance of the rebel group have an effect on the 
interveners’ choice to intervene. Both characteristics increase the possibility of an 
intervention when the incumbent party in the intervening state also has those 
characteristics. While it may be argued that this result is an artifact of using the Middle 
East as the area that was studied, this effect is lost when we look at the second results. 
Shared ethnic background and ideology between the rebel group and the 
intervening state maintain their positive effect for both kinds of intervention, with 
slightly reduced significance levels. However, the shared religion variable becomes 
significant at the 1% level and has a positive effect for passive, and negative effect for 
active interventions. Three post hoc explanations to these mixed results might be that: 
States that want to interfere in conflicts where they share a religious background with 
rebel group but do not have the opportunity to do so can try to show their support using 
other means. The second explanation is that shared religion may not be salient enough 
compared to the other characteristics to warrant a military intervention. With a lower 
threshold for entry, incumbent parties that use propaganda or provide economic support 
for that rebel group in hopes of gaining public support might not be willing to sacrifice 
resources to take a more active part in the conflict in fear of losing support by lowering 
the public spending. It can also be argued that this result is a statistical artifact from 
having a relatively smaller spatial domain and the lack of variance in terms of shared 
religious beliefs, since there are a high number of conflict dyad-years where Israel was 
dealing with a Sunni Muslim group which was receiving aid from the Arab League. 
Looking at the fixed effects model for the first regression, we observe a 0.006 
chance of intervention when the variables are set to their means (and modes for the 
binary variables). While this may seem like a low value, given Gleditsch et al.’s (2002) 
claim that 5 percent of civil wars are internationalized, we have to consider that there 
are no great powers in the data set and that the region studied has a relatively high 
number of smaller states with low capabilities. For instance, when we include the key 
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variables such as existing land borders and shared ethnic background, this value goes up 
to almost 8 percent possibility to intervene. 
Looking at the most salient variables for the theoretical debates, I will provide a 
couple of examples for the change in the likelihood of intervention. For a possible 
intervener that hasn’t intervened in the conflict -which has seen other outside 
intervention- for the past 4 years, with 9 points of polity score difference and a 1.3 times 
higher CINC score than the other non-allied state, and shared religion with the non-FTO 
rebel group fighting a revolutionary war before 1991, my model predicts a 4.58 times 
higher hazard rate for the contiguous state. If this state also shares an ethnic background 
and ideology, the likelihood to provide aid to the rebel group goes up to 29.4%, 
indicating a 50-fold increase compared to the original scenario. 
Alliance patterns play a large role in my model; setting the other variables at 
their means and modes, presence of an alliance between states reduces the risk of an 
outside help for the rebel group by 31 times. Even in the previous scenario where the 
contiguous possible intervener that shares ethnic, religious and ideological ties with the 
rebel group, alliance between states reduces the risk hazard from 29.4 percent to 1.3 
percent. 
An interesting find here is that the t, t-squared and t-cubed variables show a 
curvilinear relationship, taking their maximum value (other than t=0) close to the 5 
years with no intervention case. In that case, there is a 1.1 percent hazard rate when the 
other variables are held constant, an almost twofold increase compared to the 4 years 
with no intervention scenario. The hazard rate sharply declines until 2 years without 
intervention, then rises at its peak point at t=5 and starts its decline again. We can see 
that after an intervention, there is a two-year period of relative accord between states, 
and after the five-year period is passed, the risks of intervention are reduced to almost 
zero. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this thesis, I have provided different explanations to a number of the 
previously unanswered questions raised by the theoretical literature on third-party 
intervention in civil wars. I have tried to come up with hypotheses and illustrate the 
effects of relative state capability, alliance, international setting, and shared populations 
among other variables using the existing literature. It has been stated that in third party 
intervention literature the interactions between the state, the rebel group, and the third 
party are central to the debate, yet the relative scarcity of the scholarly work on the 
choice process of the third party reveal the need to come up with updated theoretical 
expectations. 
With this research, we have observed that the neorealist assumptions about state 
power and threat responses translate relatively better than the liberal and neoliberal 
discussions about why states provide support to rebel groups for certain kinds of 
conflicts. To recapitulate, contiguity, alliance and internationalization of the conflict 
provide the most robust explanations for third party support to rebel groups. With these 
results, we can claim that states perceive third-party intervention as an invaluable tool 
as leverage against other states. When there are no other options outside a militarized 
interstate dispute, states may choose to apply pressure using these conflicts as proxy 
wars. The ambiguity that is associated with the nature of the civil war gives the possible 
interveners a wider ground to shape their foreign policies. Also, the contagion risks 
associated with civil conflicts help shape the border relations and alliance patterns 
between states. 
Shared ethnic and religious population and ideology with the rebel group are 
other factors to consider for a state to provide support for the insurgency. The contagion 
risks that are present in contiguous states also exist for populations in other countries 
 34 
that share similar identities. Furthermore, the incumbent party may use intervention as a 
means to strengthen their domestic presence through the use of rhetoric, claiming to be 
standing alongside the “freedom fighters” against other governments. 
While these findings reveal important results and allows us to draw a pattern for 
third-party intervention choices, the analysis also reveals the flaws and deficiencies of 
such an approach to external intervention. The inconclusiveness that is borne out of the 
limits of empirical studies on civil war restricts the formation of a stronger theoretical 
foundation. And, in turn, most studies need to rely upon an imprecise theoretical 
background. What I have tried to accomplish with this thesis is to apply the literature 
that has its roots in a different era to contemporary studies, while backing my findings 
with the growing literature on intrastate warfare. 
Still, while this analysis can illustrate certain characteristics of the choice 
processes of third-party interveners in civil war, it is not a complete piece of work. The 
relatively incomprehensive theoretical foundation of intervention studies exclusive to 
intrastate intervention, and the lack of data beyond certain variables and a certain period 
of time and space pose the biggest challenges for this literature. 
However, even with a couple of unexpected results and the lack of an 
explanatory variable due to data collection problems, the analyses clearly indicate that 
the theoretical foundations of interstate intervention literature may be applied to 
intrastate interventions. As was demonstrated, the neorealist, liberal and neoliberal 
claims provide a foundation for the choice process of possible interveners in civil 
conflicts, and can be replicated using a similar research design. With the advent of an 
increasing number of studies concentrating on intrastate warfare and third-party 
intervention in the civil war process, the next step of this study will be to explore 
whether similar dynamics apply to other subregions around the world using a similar 
design. 
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